TY  - GEN
AU  - Hohmann,Sebastian
TI  - The Political Economy of Sovereign Default: Theory and Empirics 
SN  - 978-2-940503-08-7
PY  - 2012///
CY  - Genève
PB  - Graduate Institute Publications
KW  - Economics
KW  - International Relations
KW  - non-state actors and civil society
KW  - debt
KW  - financial globalisation
KW  - governance
KW  - finance
KW  - risks
KW  - State | Nation
KW  - dette
KW  - Etat | nation
KW  - finance internationale
KW  - globalisation financière
KW  - gouvernance
KW  - risques
KW  - société civile
N1  - Ebook
N2  -  What do self-interested governments’ needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The political-economy model of sovereign default developed in this ePaper shows that those governments that depend on small groups of loyalists drawn from large populations are more likely to default on sovereign debt than those governments dependent on large groups of supporters. These findings contribute to a growing body of literature on the importance of institutions in sovereign debt and default
UR  - https://books.openedition.org/iheid/509
ER  -